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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and through-
out the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, defence and 
disarmament policy pursued by the western countries ; 
Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of 
strategic nuclear weapons ; 
Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is encoun-
tering very negative reactions from many citizens of WEU member countries ; 
Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations - including the part of the Geneva 
negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons - and the resumption or revival of other negotiations 
designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere ; 
Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters might cause these negotiations to 
fail and jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security ; 
Considering that pacifist movements in East and West are anyhow entitled to call for new ini-
tiatives from the members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial 
progress in the negotiations on disarmament ; 
Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential 
for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets ; 
Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its 
defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and 
strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements ; 
Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political miion requires 
close co-ordination of national policies in these fields ; 
Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Follow attentively and encourage participating states to ensure the success of the various 
ongoing negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the 
rest of the world ; · 
2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the Uni-
ted States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the establish-
ment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such weapons 
on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained ; 
3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of 
the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public ; 
4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and 
strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities; 
5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disar-
mament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
l. In December 1981, Mr. Lemoine, Secre-
tary of State to the French Minister of Defence, 
stressed the importance of the WEU Assembly 
examining the problems raised by the develop-
ment of pacifist movements and their activities 
and the progress which neutralism seemed to be 
making among European public opinion, parti-
cularly in autumn 1981. This appeal was 
heeded since two Assembly committees took up 
the matter and the Presidential Committee 
decided to include in the agenda for the June 
1982 session a report on this subject by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, postponing until December a report by 
the General Affairs Committee on these ques-
tions. · 
2. The report submitted by Mr. Mommer-
steeg on the problem of nuclear weapons in 
Europe at the Assembly's June 1982 session 
(Document 918) made a very full and well-
informed analysis of the spread of movements 
aimed at mobilising public opinion against 
nuclear weapons, and in particular against the 
deployment of American nuclear weapons in 
Europe, in accordance with the dual decision 
taken by the North Atlantic Council in Decem~ 
her 1979. This major and interesting work 
will spare your Rapporteur much research and 
allow him to go straight to the political aspects 
of the question, taking due account of any 
information obtained about the evolution of 
pacifist movements in Europe and elsewhere 
since June 1982. 
3. The present report follows up a working 
paper examined by the General Affairs Com-
mittee on 8th July 1982. Your Rapporteur 
wishes to thank all committee members who 
took part in that preliminary discussion which 
was particularly fruitful and interesting. It 
allowed your Rapporteur to pursue his study in 
greater detail and he has willingly incorporated 
many of the remarks made about his initial 
draft. There were others however which he 
could not endorse, but he has endeavoured to 
mention them in this report as objectively as 
possible although expressing his own reserva-
tions. 
II. Neutralism 
4. The first question is what is meant by 
neutralism and pacifism. To the best of your 
Rapporteur's knowledge, the notion of neutra-
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!ism emerged in France immediately after the 
first signs of the cold war and is fairly close to 
the notion of non-alignment which subsequently 
spread to other parts of the world, including 
Yugoslavia and many countries which became 
independent following decolonisation, India 
being one of the main champions. 
5. Neutralism then stemmed from the idea 
that the two military blocs which were being 
formed were based on military, political, econo-
mic and ideological domination by the two 
great powers which emerged from the second 
world war, i.e. the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Neutralists considered it necessary for 
their countries to remain outside the systems of 
alliance so as to avoid such domination and in 
particular to be free to determine the course of 
their economic and social development. For 
France, it was a question ·or choosing a middle 
path between the excessive dirigism of the 
Soviet Union and liberalism, which some also 
considered excessive, of the American type in 
order to be able to carry out the economic and 
social programme of the resistance movement. 
The distance between this concern, that of Tito 
at the time of his break with Moscow and that 
of many leaders in the new states, was 
not very great, although these various countries' 
economic and social programmes were far from 
identical. In the political field proper, for 
France it was a question of being able to 
maintain or re-establish a government coalition 
in which the communists, who then had more 
than 25% of the votes, could have retained a 
place. Finally, in foreign policy, neutralism 
was the refusal if not of the Atlantic Alliance at 
least of any integrated military system, and it 
played a definite role, although the extent was 
difficult to measure, in the adoption of the pre-
vious question which prevented the French 
National Assembly from ratifying the draft 
treaty on the European Defence Community in 
August 1954. It is not impossible that the 
interstate nature of the protocols modifying the 
Brussels Treaty helped to win over those who 
were drawn towards certain aspects of neutra-
lism. 
6. This clearly shows the fundamental differ-
ence between neutralism and a policy of neu-
trality as pursued, each in its own fashion, by 
Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
Neutralism was the rejection of the policy of 
military blocs which might alienate the domes-
tic and foreign policies of states. It did not 
reject the choice of permanent neutrality, or 
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even alliances of free and sovereign states for 
their joint security. 
7. The concept of neutralism has naturally 
evolved considerably since 19 54, particularly 
because the Atlantic Alliance has proved to be 
flexible and has respected the right of its mem-
bers to guide their policy as they think fit. 
The way France's withdrawal from the NATO 
integrated military structure, the economic and 
social choices of the government which came to 
power in 1981 and the participation of commu-
nists in that government were accepted by the 
other members of the Atlantic Alliance, even if 
they did not approve, diverted a large fraction 
of French public opinion away from neutra-
lism. Furthermore, the evolution of the Soviet 
Union and its hold on the Eastern Euro-
pean countries, particularly after the events in 
Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
showed that in the eastern bloc self-deter-
mination existed neither for the Soviet people 
nor for its allies and that a western defence 
policy offered the only possible framework for 
protecting the right of the European nations to 
decide on their political and social regime. 
8. Thus, the neutralism of the fifties now no 
longer has at all the same meaning and one 
may wonder whether neutralism still exists in 
Europe other than in the form of anxiety that 
the European countries may, because of the 
existence of two military blocs, become invol-
ved in a war in which there would be a high 
risk of nuclear weapons being used. This form 
of neutralism, which is not very different from a 
refusal to accept any true defence policy, is 
closer to pacifism than to post-war ideological 
neutralism. 
9. Seen in this light, a certain number of 
aspects of neutralism today deserve attention : 
I O.(l) Under the guise of refusing military blocs 
it rejects the Atlantic Alliance, or in any event 
a number of its consequences for Western Europe, 
without accepting the fact, however evident 
it may seem, that the alliance has had beneficial 
effects for Europe. On the one hand, although 
it has not totally eradicated the innumerable 
causes of conflict which for centuries have split 
Western Europe, it has at least reduced them to 
a point of far less gravity. The fact that no 
one any longer considers there is a heriditary or 
even potential enemy among his neighbours 
and that no one any longer thinks of resorting 
to force as a means of settling any problems 
which may arise in relations between states is a 
huge step forward in the history of European 
mankind. A community organisation of West-
em Europe, in the economic field at least, was 
possible only because there was a defensive 
alliance. Moreover, this alliance has allowed a 
relative balance of forces and mutual deterrence 
to be maintained, enabling our continent to 
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avoid armed conflict for thirty-eight years, 
which is unprecedented in its history. There 
is absolutely no guarantee that the dissolution 
of this alliance would not lead to an imbalance 
of forces which would be liable to revive 
dreams of domination and allow dangerous 
speculation about the ability or desire of one or 
other country to resist. The balance of terror 
is certainly not the most desirable form of rela-
tions between states and the dissolution of the 
blocs may be considered as the aim of a collec-
tive security policy. Neutralism makes it a 
means of strengthening peace, which is in any 
case not evident. 
ll.{iz) It should be noted that the very people 
who are trying within the Warsaw Pact to 
obtain greater freedom or to move away from 
Soviet domination clearly reject any form of 
neutralism and proclaim their loyalty to alli-
ance with the Soviet Union. Such words 
were not enough of course to reassure the 
Soviet Union or to avert the invasion of Czecho-
slov-akia and pressure on Poland, probably 
because they were not thought to be sincere. 
However, the liberalisation of the Eastern 
European regimes can be considered only in the 
context of the overall evolution of the eastern 
bloc and not by certain countries breaking away 
and moving towards neutralism. It cannot 
therefore be hoped that the neutralism emerging 
in Western Europe will spread to the East 
through contagion. It is hardly likely and 
probably not very desirable for the peoples of 
the area and for peace in Europe, as proved by 
the Polish affair. 
12.(iil) The consequence of dismantling the 
western defence system in Europe would be to 
leave each Western European country in a posi-
tion of weakness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 
which, without even having to resort to force, 
would be able to impose on them certain con-
straints in their political, economic or social 
lives, their external relations and individual 
freedom. Rightly or wrongly, this process has 
often been called Finlandisation. Finland's 
situation may admittedly not seem intolerable 
to outside observers nor, which is more impor-
tant, to the Finns. Nevertheless, Finland's fate 
largely depends on balances stretching well 
beyond its frontiers, and there is nothing to 
show that, between the Soviet Union and a 
neutralised Europe, Finland would be able to 
protect the freedom it has preserved in more 
favourable circumstances. The picture con-
jured up by the word Finlandisation is extre-
mely vague and is only a very imperfect reflec-
tion of what a neutralised Western Europe's 
fate might be in a Soviet-dominated continent. 
13.(iv) In such conditions, the logic of true neu-
tralism for Western Europe would be to acquire 
by and for itself sufficient means of deterrence 
to be able to ensure its own security without 
having to take account of interference from out-
side. It is a long way from this and its econo-
mic difficulties since 1973 leave little likelihood 
of it being able to achieve this in the foresee-
able future. Short of that, neutralism for Europe 
would be a weakness, not a force. It would 
not be a guarantee but a threat to its freedom. 
It would not be a factor of peace but a danger 
of war in Europe. 
14.(v) These remarks obviously do not apply to 
Germany as a whole to the same extent as the 
rest of Europe, and it is quite understandable 
that the prospect of reunification for the Ger-
man nation would make it easier to accept the 
idea of Finlandisation as a price of reunifica-
tion, particularly for the citizens of the GDR 
for whom, after all, Finlandisation would not 
mean less freedom. However, certain German 
members of the committee recalled most use-
fully that pacifist or neutralist demonstrations 
in the GDR in 1981 and 1982 were severely 
put down, whereas pacifist or neutralist 
demonstrations in the Federal Republic were 
given wide coverage in the press and other 
media of Eastern European countries. 
15.(vi) All these considerations show clearly 
that although the Soviet Union is not always 
behind neutralism in Western Europe it is 
trying to derive the maximum benefit from it, 
while doing its utmost to stifle neutralism in 
Eastern Europe. Conversely, Western European 
neutralist movements, whether or not inspired, 
assisted or encouraged by the Soviet Union, 
serve Soviet strength, which does not hesitate to 
back their action. Just as the development of a 
form of neutralism in Europe in the years 
preceding the second world war cannot be attri-
buted solely to the influence of Hitlerism, its 
development in present-day Europe cannot be 
attributed solely to Soviet influence. However, 
it has to be recorded that just as the absence of 
cohesion or of the desire of many European 
countries to defend themselves strongly con-
tributed to the general collapse in face of Hit-
lerian aggression, today the development of 
neutralism which refuses to build up the mili-
tary means required for the policy it advocates 
might sorely tempt the Soviet Union and pro-
vide it with opportunities to use its strength to 
impose its will on Europe. 
III. Pacifism 
16. The notion of pacifism has far more 
ancient and varied roots. There were protests 
in the nineteenth century against the use of 
force by states as a means of action for 
promoting their interests. From the very 
outset, the international workers' movement 
denounced such methods and made peace one 
of its major aims. It was joined by other move-
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ments, sometimes Christian, sometimes non-
religious, which multiplied before and particu-
larly after the second world war. 
17. The originality of pacifism is not to 
advocate the peaceful settlement of conflicts but 
to place peace before all else and underline that 
no cause is worth the sacrifice of human lives 
implicit in modem warfare. The first world 
war, whose causes were far removed from the 
vital interests of the European nations but 
which was responsible for the death of more 
than ten million people and nearly five years' 
suffering for almost all the inhabitants of Europe, 
obviously gave considerable impetus to this 
tendency, particularly among the left-wing par-
ties and socialists. It emerged as a fight against 
the militarist tendencies then coming to the fore 
in many European societies, the rejection of 
military budgets, calls to reduce military service 
and unremitting objections to the armaments 
policy pursued before and after the war. 
18. It is evident that the rise of fascism and 
its conquest of Europe were a serious blow to 
pacifism which bore its share of responsibility 
for the weakness shown by the European demo-
cracies towards Hitler. Unlike the first world 
war, the second left little room for pacifism and 
left-wing parties everywhere were in the van-
guard in the anti-fascist struggle throughout 
Europe. 
19. Thus, whereas neutralism is a purely 
political concept based on a certain analysis of 
the world situation, pacifism is based on purely 
moral concerns, passing over political consi-
derations to oppose anything relating to war, 
armaments or armed forces. Conscientious 
objection is one of its traditional forms. 
However, the situation in Europe in the fascist 
era showed the limits of protest which, separat-
ing peace from every other value, risked help-
ing the cause of those who were trying to over-
ride Europe and make war the instrument of 
their domination. This was an experience 
which cannot be forgotten by the generations 
then alive and the facts must be constantly 
recalled for subsequent generations. 
20. For a long time pacifism was merely a 
protest, a refusal of everything in modem 
society that might lead to war or hostilities. 
However, at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, pacifists felt they were strong enough to 
consider action which was not just intended to 
impress public opinion by symbolic gestures, 
like German socialists who, after 4th September 
18 70, risked imprisonment by organising 
demonstrations against continuing the war 
against France following the fall of Napoleon 
III. Thus, within the international workers' 
movement, a concept of general strike emerged 
with the specific purpose of preventing govern-
ments from resorting to force. But the cir-
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cumstances in which the first world war broke 
out prevented international socialism from unit-
ing to put a halt to the governments' policy of 
conquest and it subsequently paid dearly for the 
helplessness it then showed. 
21. Although the division of the workers' 
movement on the one hand and the rise of fas-
cism on the other considerably weakened the 
possibilities of action of those with pacifist 
leanings between the two wars, new means of 
expression and new strategies have been worked 
out in recent years. Immediately after the 
second world war, the peace movement, very 
clearly dominated by communist parties, endeav-
oured to rally public opinion in Western 
European countries against American policy 
which insisted on the rearmament of the Fede-
ral Republic as a condition for maintaining 
American forces in Europe. The Korean war, 
the Atlantic Pact, the European Defence Com-
munity and later the Vietnam war were step-
ping stones for agitation directed mainly against 
the organisation of western defence although 
the true aim, for those organising it at least, was 
to support Soviet policy. Events in the GDR, 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia progres-
sively undermined any credence there may have 
been in a movement whose true goal, as it 
became increasingly evident, was not peace. 
22. The same cannot be said about the more 
recent shape of the pacifist movement, although 
one may conclude that in the last resort the 
same cause is espoused. Pacifism today is 
based mainly on the particularly inhumane 
nature of any war involving nuclear weapons. 
Hence it is no longer a movement pursuing 
particular political objectives but the expression 
of a profound reaction which is quite under-
standable when it is borne in mind that there 
would be little chance of any war in Europe not 
crossing the nuclear threshold. Thus, the 
Christian churches, or related associations, 
which hitherto had remained aloof from pacifist 
demonstrations, are now prominent, be it the 
catholic church, particularly in the United 
States and to a lesser degree in France, or pro-
testant churches in the Netherlands, Germany, 
the Scandinavian countries and even, more cau-
tiously, the United Kingdom. The same is 
true of. many associations of a non-political 
nature, including ecologists. 
23. More than its predecessors, this new paci-
fism has sought to make proposals and to define 
concepts of security which are no longer based 
on the accumulation of armaments, particularly 
nuclear arms. It emphasises the waste of 
wealth represented by military expenditure in a 
world where the true problems are the develop-
ment of the third world and the horrors of 
modern warfare. At the same time it points to 
the meagre results obtained in disarmament 
negotiations in whatever framework they may 
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have been held and urges society to bring pres-
sure to bear on the governments by all available 
means to make them take steps, if necessary 
unilaterally, to set the world on a new 
course. Certain pacifist associations such as 
the movement for a non-violent alternative 
bring together persons who are highly respect- · 
able because of their political impartiality, 
moral and intellectual values and standing 
among young people to work out a possible 
defence policy in which non-violence would no 
longer be merely an objective but also a means 
of action by states and peoples to ensure their 
security. This research is of great interest 
because it is based oil a serious analysis of the 
notion of deterrence. Its aim is not to dispense 
with deterrence but to achieve it by means 
which would be unlikely to arouse reactions of 
fear on the part of the potential enemy. 
However, one may wonder how effective such 
deterrence might be and how much impact it 
may have in practice. 
24. Another aspect of the present form of 
pacifism is its partial or total rejection of 
nuclear weapons. Sometimes it totally rejects 
a defence policy based on the balance of terror, 
i.e. any form of nuclear deterrence, or calls for 
a solemn declaration by governments not to be 
the first to use nuclear weapons, which is 
almost the same since renouncing first use of 
such weapons would be tantamount to 
renouncing their use to retaliate against a 
conventional attack, thus annulling any deter-
rent effect. At other times there is less radical 
opposition to nuclear weapons, the intention 
being to strengthen their deterrent role rather 
than limit it. This is the case of opposition to 
enhanced radiation weapons and, generally 
speaking, to so-called theatre nuclear wea-
pons. Here the basic idea is that only fear of 
massive retaliation has a deterrent effect, 
whereas the possibility of waging a limited 
nuclear war makes it possible for the great 
nuclear powers to envisage winning a war 
without resorting to strategic nuclear wea-
pons. While recognising that only strategic 
nuclear weapons play the essential deterrent 
role, your Rapporteur considers however that 
in present circumstances it would be dangerous 
to give a potential adversary the impression 
that he might have a choice of weapons 
and hence some hope that the West might 
hesitate to use strategic weapons in response to 
a limited attack. 
25. These remarks apply only for pacifism as 
it is known in the West. But it now appears 
that a similar form of pacifism is emerging in 
Eastern Europe, particularly in the GDR and 
the Soviet-Union. This is a welcome sign, not 
because pacifism would weaken these countries 
but because it can provide an area of agreement 
between East and West by encouraging the east-
ern countries, in matters relating to disarma-
ment, to take account of pacifist views and 
hence foster East-West rapprochement on mat-
ters which are essential for peace. It should be 
noted however that pacifist demonstrations are 
still considered seditious in Eastern Europe and 
are therefore fought and repressed, particularly 
in the Soviet Union and the GDR. Thus, at 
its fifth meeting in September 1982 the Central 
Committee of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, the 
youth branch of the SED, decided to conduct a 
vigorous campaign against the effects of the 
pacifist movement on young people in the 
GDR and inter alia against the spread of con-
scientious objection. 
26. It can therefore be seen that the pacifist 
movement is disturbing in both East and West. 
On each side, there is a tendency to attribute 
its influence to manoeuvres by the other side so 
as to evade the highly pertinent questions it 
raises for our societies. But to look just 
beyond suspicion which may stem from its 
opposition to government policies and examine 
the reasons guiding it and the elements of 
society supporting it, one has to note that on 
both sides these reasons are respectable, and 
these social groups are particularly worthy of 
interest since apart from intellectual circles they 
also represent the younger elements of society. 
It would therefore be morally contestable and 
politically imprudent not to take full account of 
its aspirations, to refuse a dialogue with it and 
not to weigh carefully its arguments, even if it 
seems difficult to accept some of its conclu-
sions. 
IV. The revival of agitation since 1980 
27. In recent years, there has been agitation 
in Western Europe which has sometimes hastily 
been qualified as neutralist and pacifist and 
which reached a peak in October 1981. This 
agitation had an echo in the United States and 
in the German Democratic Republic. Having 
been analysed in Mr. Mommersteeg's report 
your Rapporteur will not therefore go back 
over it. . He will merely bring out a few fea-
tures in order to draw conclusions. 
28. A first comment concerns the link bet-
ween agitation and nuclear weapons. It is a 
definite fact that the prospect of American 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons being 
deployed in Europe, although not the origin of 
the protest movement, gave the movement, 
which had existed since nuclear weapons came 
into being, particular importance and signifi-
cance. Moreover, it is not difficult to see how 
this weapon of mass destruction, with ill-
controlled side effects, can instil considerable 
horror and fear resulting in the belief that 
anything would be better than nuclear war. 
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The fact that, unlike strategic nuclear weapons 
which are launched from aircraft, submarines 
or silos in the United States or Soviet Union, 
intermediate-range weapons are for deploy-
ment in Europe itself, on permanent· sites 
dispersed in many areas, has drawn attention to 
the dangers their presence represents for many 
sections of the population of Europe. Tactical 
nuclear weapons, also deployed in Europe, had 
not provoked such . strong reactions because, 
being mobile, they were less in evidence and 
did not form the same kind of target. 
29. Hence it would be a mistake to attribute 
to Soviet propaganda alone a movement whose 
scale was demonstrated in Mr. Mommersteeg's 
report and which affects many circles which 
can hardly be suspected of being influenced by 
Moscow. This obviously does not mean that 
such propaganda has been inactive and it has 
certainly done its utmost to exploit a favourable 
situation in order to weaken the West's deter-
mination to resist and to create a gap between 
the European and American partners of the 
Atlantic Alliance. Certain committee mem-
bers pointed out that the Soviet Union was 
financing some pacifist movements, including 
the World Peace Council. One member recalled 
a remark by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of 
NATO, that $ 15 million are believed to have 
been spent by the Soviet Union on pacifist 
campaigns in Western Europe in 1981. But 
Soviet propaganda would certainly not have 
managed to give the protest movements the 
impetus they gained when directed against the 
NATO dual decision of December 1979 if fer-
tile ground had not been found in Europe and, 
to a certain extent, in the United States where 
the uncompromising policy pursued by Presi-
dent Reagan, especially towards the Soviet 
Union, revived the fear· of a nuclear war in 
which the United States might not be spared. 
30. Among today's pacifist movements, there 
is obviously no complete unity of doctrine 
nor even of fundamental motives, insofar as it 
is possible to determine what they are. Several 
trends can be distinguished however: 
31.(1) Opposition to theatre .nuclear weapons, 
caused mainly by. the NATO dual decision of 
December 1979 and the prospect of the deve-
lopment of enhanced radiation weapons, the 
so-called neutron bomb, which would also be 
theatre weapons. This opposition is largely 
based on a concept of deterrence which corres-
ponded to circumstances twenty or thirty years 
ago but far less to the present situation. In 
fact, true deterrence, exercised by the United 
States, then also by the United Kingdom and 
finally by France, was based on the doctrine of 
massive retaliation, alone capable of diverting a 
potential adversary from aggressive intentions 
by convincing him that any war would bring 
unacceptable destruction to his own territory. 
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This doctrine now seems out of date where 
United States and Soviet strategy in Europe are 
concerned because the existence of short- or 
medium-range weapons which can be used 
against the attacking force makes the immediate 
use of intercontinental-range weapons less cred-
ible: is it imaginable that, when countries are 
able to stop a conventional attack, they will 
risk their own territory being laid waste? But 
it is particularly difficult to make public 
opinion understand the reasoning behind deter-
rence, that a country wishing to avoid war must 
equip itself to fight a war, since what distin-
guishes a deterrent policy from a policy of war 
is not the weapons, which remain the same, but 
the use it is intended to make of them. 
32.(iz) A distinction between the possession of 
nuclear weapons and their use, which has led 
certain pacifists to ask the western governments 
to undertake not to be the first to use such wea-
pons. It is not necessary to underline the 
danger of this idea whose effect, if adopted, 
would be to leave the way open for a potential 
enemy with far more troops and conventional 
weapons to use them without risk of nuclear 
retaliation. This would destroy deterrence and 
make war more probable without even really 
preventing nuclear escalation after the outbreak 
of war. 
33.(iii) The formation of denuclearised zones, 
for long proposed by certain Eastern European 
countries, particularly in the Rapacki plan, is 
again being considered by certain pacifist move-
ments, mainly in Scandinavia. Although such 
proposals might be considered for regions where 
there is no risk of conventional attack by a 
stronger enemy, in Europe they would have the 
same effect as an undertaking not to be the first 
to use nuclear weapons. 
34.(iv)The appeal for western countries to aban-
don completely the possession of nuclear wea-
pons, taken up inter alia by the conference of 
American catholic bishops, is liable to become 
one of the main themes of pacifist movements 
in the next few months. Coming from the 
United States, this call is expected to find a 
wide response in the third world. It is based 
on the full horror of nuclear war but takes no 
account of the fact that conventional war would 
probably be hardly less horrific, at least in 
Europe, nor of the fact that the aim of nuclear 
weapons is not war but deterrence and that 
their disappearance, outside the framework of a 
general agreement on disarmament, would 
make war more likely. 
35.(v) Not far removed from this primarily anti-
nuclear pacifism is the action of ecological 
movements which have spread in the last ten 
years and whose electoral results in certain 
countries are a measure of their strong influ-
ence on public opinion, particularly as clearly 
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many people who do not vote for the ecologists 
are alive to their concerns. Ecologists can 
admittedly be distinguished from pacifists 
because their main concern is the protection of 
the natural surroundings rather than external or 
defence policy. But they are close in their 
more or less radical opposition to any military 
or civil activities which make use of nuclear 
activity. 
36.(vi)The claim for a new balance between 
expenditure on armaments and that for assis-
tance to the third world is based on two consi-
derations, one purely humanitarian which 
underlines the scandal of the extreme poverty 
of a large part of the world population and the 
other, more political, which recalls that poverty 
is a far greater danger to tomorrow's peace than 
any military threat whatever. There is nothing 
to say in answer to these two arguments, which 
are perfectly fair, and if it is considered that the 
requirements of the third world should be given 
priority, there is no excuse for the slender assis-
tance granted by the industrialised countries. 
But this has no direct connection with arma-
ments. If they are useless, there is no excuse 
for accumulating them. But if it is considered 
that there is a real threat from outside, there 
would be no excuse for abandoning them. 
Consequently analysis of the military threat 
must govern armaments policy and analysis of 
the situation of the third world must determine 
assistance policy, there being no grounds for 
linking the two elements. 
3 7 .(viz) In several countries, particularly the 
United Kingdom, pacifist movements are pro-
posing unilateral disarmament measures in the 
hope that such decisions will lead other coun-
tries to follow suit. At its conference in 
September 1982, the Labour Party, while 
confirming its loyalty to NATO, adopted a 
motion calling for such measures in the field of 
nuclear weapons. It must be wondered first 
whether this would effectively be the case and 
then whether such measures would not in the 
long run have the reverse effect of that sought 
because, a priori, they would deprive disarma-
ment negotiations of their content. 
38.(viii) Finally, as your Rapporteur noted 
above, in other countries, including the Nether-
lands, the Federal Republic and the Scandi-
navian countries, pacifist movements have 
adopted a neutralist tone, whereas in others, 
such as France, still-powerful neutralist ten-
dencies have little link with pacifism and in yet 
others, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, pacifism is important but in 
no way associated with neutralism. The com-
mittee pondered on the reasons for these differ-
ences. Some members attributed the lack of 
influence of the peace movement in France to 
its links with communism and underlined the 
difficult position in which events in Poland 
placed this movement. These remarks are 
certainly to the point, but are they adequate 
explanation? What role was played by the fact 
that certain Western European countries have 
nuclear weapons while others have none? 
What part was played by more ancient cultural 
or religious traditions? Whether or not the 
left, closer to the pacifists than the right, is in 
power certainly has some effect. Your Rap-
porteur is convinced that it is impossible to 
reduce to simple and unequivocal elements the 
complex facts which explain the reactions of 
the various peoples of Europe to pacifism 
today. 
39. These protest movements or proposals 
can therefore be assimilated neither to neutra-
lism nor to pacifism in the traditional sense. 
They do not necessarily deny that a Soviet 
threat exists and in general do not refuse the 
means of countering it. The famous slogan 
" Better red than dead " heard in certain 
demonstrations in Germany does not seem to 
take due account of these movements' main 
roots which cannot therefore be confused with 
traditional pacifism. Therefore, while they 
have a neutralist aspect because of their desire 
to take account of political and military facts 
and not allow Western Europe to become over-
dependent on decisions taken in Washington 
and a pacifist aspect because of their absolute 
rejection of certain weapons, they cannot be 
confused with either. 
40. Finally, it must be noted that these are 
worthy reactions, not only because of their 
motives but also because of their scope and the 
determination and moral and intellectual quali-
ties of many of their proponents. Hence, paci-
fism cannot be assimilated to an enemy who 
must be fought, an aberration which must be 
put right at all cost or a blind instrument used 
by an external power. In the United States in 
particular, but in many European countries 
too, it seems to meet deep-rooted national aspi-
rations. It must be taken seriously and a true 
dialogue must be held with the leaders of paci-
fist movements in order to find the means of 
ensuring true European security, due account 
being taken of the nature of the danger from 
without and of the threats which western acti-
vities might also involve for peace. 
V. The imperatives of European security 
41. There are two categories of reasons for 
taking full account of the spread of pacifist and 
neutralist movements in the West. First, the 
intrinsic value of their concerns, proposals and 
claims, second the extent of the movements, 
their ability to mobilise public opinion and the 
influence of those who help them, in short their 
political weight. Democratic regimes cannot 
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turn a blind eye to what a large proportion of 
their citizens want and think. It is therefore 
important to answer their concerns and, 
although the answer cannot always be fully 
positive, it must nevertheless take account of 
the arguments put forward and not merely 
reject requests which a large section of society 
has at heart. One question is how large is this 
section. It is often difficult to assess the num-
ber taking part in big pacifist demonstrations, 
their commitment and their enthusiasm. For 
instance, the fact that in France far fewer peo-
ple take part in such demonstrations than in 
Italy, Germany or the Netherlands may be due 
to political considerations and may not neces-
sarily mean that pacifism has less of a hold on 
French people than on people in neighbouring 
countries. 
42. Still more important is the impact of the 
ideas upheld by pacifist and neutralist move-
ments. It is evident that in the period of crisis 
through which the world is now passing mili-
tary expenditure is a waste of resources which 
could be better used elsewhere, particularly for 
investments in the third world. Similarly, the 
accumulation of nuclear weapons places peace 
on unhealthy foundations and creates dangers, 
whose scale is difficult to assess, of war being 
started by mistake or by accident, or of escala-
tion in the event of hostilities. Moreover, the 
same is true of conventional weapons which, in 
the last decade, have caused millions of victims 
in vast areas of the world and whose improve-
ment, at the same time as the miniaturisation of 
nuclear weapons, makes it increasingly difficult 
to envisage war stopping at the nuclear thres-
hold. 
43. The only way of meeting the challenge of 
pacifism and neutralism is therefore to show a 
genuine will first to limit armaments and forces 
and then to achieve true disarmament. It is 
easy to understand that the meagre results the 
world has achieved in this field have raised 
doubts· about the seriousness with which the 
governments have tackled the question of disar-
mament and encouraged considerable scepti-
cism about speeches made on this subject in the 
United Nations and elsewhere. It should be 
added that the American decision not to ratify 
the SALT II agreements after the Soviet 
Union's invasion of Afghanistan rightly or 
wrongly gave the impression that a process of 
limiting armaments by negotiated consent bet-
ween the two great powers had been inter-
rupted. This may help to explain the spread of 
pacifist initiatives in America and in Europe 
since it might be wondered whether, following 
this break in a process already started, there 
was a way of disarming other than by unilateral 
decisions taken in individual countries or 
means of bringing pressure to bear on states 
other than by resorting to demonstrations or 
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strikes, such as a peace movement which is in 
the process of acquiring a European structure 
and strategy seems to be organising throughout 
Europe in 1983. 
44. Your Rapporteur nevertheless remains 
convinced that the only form of disarmament 
which can consolidate peace is one which 
ensures the security of all, i.e. that any unila-
teral initiative would involve serious dangers 
because peace is based on a certain balance of 
forces. Overall security and disarmament can 
be protected by structuring international 
society, by negotiated decisions and by specific 
and controlled measures, whereas unilateral 
decisions would deprive these negotiations of 
meaning and jeopardise their success. 
45. This is particularly true of the western 
countries because in almost every field the 
Atlantic Alliance forces are now in a position 
of inferiority compared with those of the 
Warsaw Pact and any unilateral disarmament 
on their part would increase their inferiority 
and hence the chances of armed conflict. 
While the Warsaw Pact lead seems to have only 
limited implications where strategic nuclear 
weapons are concerned, this is not so for 
conventional weapons, particularly tanks, artil-
lery and combat aircraft and, above all, 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Even the 
United States navy has been caught up by the 
Soviet Union. At the request of the commit-
tee, your Rapporteur has had· a comparative 
table of these forces drawn up, which is given at 
appendix. 
46. Furthermore, the relatively small propor-
tion of their gross national product earmarked 
for defence (5.9 % in the United States, 5.1 % in 
the United Kingdom, 3.9% in France, 3.4% in 
the Netherlands, 3.3 % in Belgium, 3.2 % in the 
Federal Republic and 2.4% in Italy) has pre-
vented the countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
from replacing their armaments at the same 
rate as the Soviet Union, which appears to 
spend between 12 and 14% of its GNP on 
defence, while the other members of the 
Warsaw Pact spend about the same proportion 
as the western countries. It is therefore prob-
able that the quantitative inferiority of western 
armaments is no longer offset by qualitative 
superiority as was the case ten years ago. 
4 7. Europe can ensure its security by asso-
ciating a true disarmament policy with a 
defence policy which retains the elements of 
credible deterrence by convincing Europeans 
themselves, then their American partners and 
finally the Soviet Union, that it does not intend 
disarmament to be a renunciation or the begin-
ning of neutralisation, but that it has a place in 
a coherent operation of which it is a major aim. 
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Certain pacifists wish disarmament to be a 
means of achieving detente and peace, but in 
present circumstances it can but be a conse-
quence of this although subsequently it may 
help to consolidate what has been achieved. 
To tackle the problem of disarmament in 
isolation from military necessities and political 
realities would be a threat to the peace and 
freedom of Western Europe. 
48. · No more than for its security, there is no 
reason why Europe should rely wholly on the 
United States for everything connected with 
disarmament. It can certainly not act without 
the United States, and a committee member 
recalled that the North Atlantic Council should 
place greater emphasis on the European wish 
to associate defence and disarmament as already 
expressed in the Harmel plan. This would 
require close consultations on disarmament 
matters between the European members of the 
alliance. The WEU Council could and there-
fore should be the framework for such consul-
tations because this is its own particular area of 
responsibility. Faced with the desire of the 
peace movement to adopt a European strategy, 
it is of some importance for the governments of 
Western European countries to concert their 
response, which need not be identical, so as not 
to react according to national or local situations 
and thus disperse Europe's approach to its 
defence and disarmament requirements. Eco-
nomic difficulties in all our countries are strong 
encouragement for such reactions. In a European 
Community economy it is difficult to envisage 
unduly wide differences in the military burden 
on national economies. This does not mean 
that cuts in military expenditure must be 
avoided, but they should perhaps be limited in 
the immediate future with a view to negotiating 
a balanced reduction with the Warsaw Pact. 
49. Such a step will surely find encourage-
ment in the policy pursued by President 
Reagan, who can in no way be accused of being 
unaware of the Soviet threat. This policy is 
highly positive and encouraging since it led to 
the START negotiations being opened in 
Geneva together with negotiations on so-called 
Eurostrategic nuclear weapons on a basis which 
should be satisfactory to pacifists, i.e. the zero 
option or the controlled elimination of all 
medium-range nuclear weapons. This propo-
sal is in the interests of all insofar as the 
deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons 
known as instruments of limited warfare is a 
particularly serious danger because it might 
give the impression that an attack in Europe 
might lead to the total nuclear destruction of 
this area without the two great powers being 
fully involved. It is not by chance that the 
announcement of the deployment of these 
weapons caused the most widespread pacifist 
demonstrations in Europe, and one of the 
lessons to be learned from these demonstrations 
should be to make the destruction of these 
weapons one of the first aims of disarmament, 
which fully conforms to President Reagan's 
proposals. 
50. Moreover, very probably the United 
States Government's determination to· adopt 
this approach has shown the green light for a 
whole series of negotiations which appeared to 
be marking time, be it the MBFR talks, the 
conference of the Disarmament Committee or 
the United Nations special session on disar-
mament. Admittedly, no agreement seems 
· imminent in any of these frameworks but the 
resumption of diplomatic activity in the disar-
mament field - provided it is not merely a 
. question of appeasing the pacifist movements 
but is based on a true will to succeed - will 
presumably show these movements that the 
western countries are determined to reach 
agreement with the Soviet Union and its allies 
for an effective reduction of armaments or, one 
way or another, they will force the Warsaw 
Pact countries to assume their responsibilities 
towards their own citizens and towards the rest 
of the world by revealing whether they consider 
disarmament to be merely a tactic designed to 
weaken the West or whether it is really a goal. 
51. Another question on which the new paci-
fist movement may be right is probably that 
any war in Europe could well lead to a nuclear 
exchange on its territory. Already a conven-
tional war on this territory would have deadly 
and highly devastating effects because of the 
density of the population and the extreme fragi-
lity of present-day industrial and urban civilisa-
tion. Although military planners now tend to 
think that any war would be short for lack of 
sufficient means to wage a long one, such rea-
soning is no more infallible than the same way 
of thinking was in 1914. Hence it is essential 
for war no longer to be envisaged as a means of 
pursuing a policy but it should be realised that, 
victorious or not, it would lead to the destruc-
tion of all the values upheld by the West. 
52. What is less evident is that the presence 
of nuclear weapons increases the risk of war 
and even of nuclear war. It may even be 
considered that the existence of such weapons 
has removed much of the threat of war from 
the areas they protected, and countries equip-
ped with them have had to find peaceful means 
of ending the many conflicts which have arisen 
between them in the past thirty-five years. 
Conversely, it is in areas where there were no 
nuclear weapons to play a deterrent role that 
armed and often deadly conflicts have increased 
during the period in question. 
53. Where NATO's dual decision in 1979 
may be called in question is in the extent to 
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which it would make nuclear weapons an 
instrument of strategic fighting rather than of a 
policy of deterrence. It is on this point that 
the discussions which have been going on in the 
United States for the last twenty years raise a 
problem. While strategic nuclear weapons are 
the ideal instrument of deterrence, the military 
array of the West must not hide such weapons 
or make their use in the event of attack more 
uncertain but, on the contrary, it must enhance 
them and convince a potential aggressor that he 
cannot hope to wage battle and win without 
risk of such weapons being used. ' 
54. In other words, the aim of the western 
allies should not be a balance of forces and 
weapons at every level but, on the contrary, 
deployment limited to the requirements of 
deterrence. An American force which, as 
everyone knows, is only too small, is essential 
for Europe's security, not so that it may fight 
Soviet forces but because its very inadequacy 
proves that the strategic force of the United 
States will be involved should there be an attack 
on Western Europe. Similarly, short- or inter-
mediate-range nuclear weapons do not have to 
equal in quantity those deployed by the Soviet 
Union lest they give the impression that the 
West is prepared to accept a conflict limited to 
a given nuclear level. Their presence is neces-
sary to convince the Soviet Union that it 
cannot hope to stop escalation at the level of its 
choice. If Western Europe had no short- or 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons to confront 
the some 350 SS-20 missiles now deployed by . 
the Soviet Union in Europe, it would be pos-
sible for a potential aggressor to speculate on 
his superiority in the conventional field and 
confront the United States with the impossible 
choice between abandoning Western Europe to 
its sorry fate or releasing an exchange of strate-
gic nuclear weapons which would ravage Ame-
rican territory. The existence of a limited 
number of such weapons, on the contrary, is 
enough to convince a potential aggressor that a 
conventional attack would lead to escalation 
and hence gives true weight to the American 
deterrent. 
55. This in no way signifies, as certain com-
mittee members thought, that your Rapporteur 
oonsiders the doctrine of. massive retaliation 
should be resuscitated. On the contrary, the 
doctrine of flexible response must be given its 
full deterrent value by not allowing it to 
become just a combat doctrine. But here again 
the main aim should be to reach an agreement 
banning the deployment of medium-range 
nuclear weapons by the West but also obliging 
the Soviet Union to renounce its SS-20 and 
other missiles (SS-4s and SS-5s). 
56. Because of its limited means, France has 
to base its security on a minimum level of 
deterrence: its conventional forces, its tactical 
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nuclear weapons and its eighteen intermediate-
range missiles are not enough to stop an inva-
sion, but this limited deployment gives full 
deterrent value to strategic nuclear weapons 
which, although also limited, should be enough 
to convince an enemy that he would sustain 
intolerable losses and damage in the event of an 
attack on Western Europe. Consequently, 
French defence policy, whose principles have 
not been modified by the recent change of 
majority, seems to meet security requirements 
quite well, not only those of France but also of 
most Western European countries which admit-
ted, in the North Atlantic Council declaration 
in Ottawa in 1974, that the fact that two 
European members of the alliance " possess 
nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent 
role of their own " contributes to the overall 
strengthening of the deterrence of the alliance. 
This declaration noting the specific deterrent 
role of the French and British nuclear forces 
appears to correspond quite closely to the 
present views of most European members of 
the alliance which in fact no longer have much 
objection to them while the French Govern-
ment for its part has on several occasions, parti-
cularly since May 1981, recalled that it consi-
ders France's security area begins far beyond its 
national frontiers. 
57. But it is not simply a matter of arma-
ments. There is every reason to think that 
pacifist reactions in Europe since December 
1979 also express uneasiness of a political 
nature in view of the fact that the strategy 
implemented in the framework of NATO is in 
fact defined in the United States and adopted 
by the latter's European allies in the North 
Atlantic Council under political, military and 
often economic pressure. The overwhelming 
domination of the United States in the defence 
field indeed makes it almost impossible for its 
partners to oppose the application of measures 
already decided upon by the United States 
Government, even if these partners do not feel 
such measures meet their true interests. The 
threat, explicit or more often implicit, of a 
withdrawal of American forces from Europe, 
whose effect would be to undermine NATO's 
deterrent strength, is generally enough to win 
over those who might be tempted to oppose 
such decisions. But it is evident that this 
situation is not likely to calm the legitimate 
anxiety of the populations. In this connection, 
one may wonder about the degree of consensus 
reached in the North Atlantic Council in 
December 1979 since several countries that 
took part in reaching this decision seem to be 
having the greatest djfficulty in carrying it into 
effect at home. 
58. This problem, raised by American pre-
ponderance in the alliance, is even more serious 
when United States policy seems to waiver. In 
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the last ten years this has often happened, parti-
cularly where nuclear strategy is concerned, and 
the recent article by four leading Americans in 
Foreign Affairs, asking for the development of 
western conventional forces in NATO, was not 
likely to reassure that portion of European 
public opinion which is wondering whether the 
Americans truly wish to place the deterrent 
strength of their strategic nuclear force at the 
service of their allies. 
59. It is certainly not without significance 
that the two European countries with a deter-
rent capability of their own, the United King-
dom and France, have not experienced anti-
nuclear reactions comparable to demonstrations 
in. the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and even Italy. Is the reason not to 
be found in the dependence of the latter coun-
tries on American decisions where defence 
policy is concerned? The question is worthy 
of consideration. 
60. Finally, if the message transmitted by the 
1981 demonstrators is taken seriously, it is 
clearly urgent to advance towards disarmament. 
Indeed, if the West does not show it is pre-
pared to embark resolutely on the road to disar-
mament provided its security is ensured, it will 
give the impression that it is not really deter-
mined to succeed. 
61. In your Rapporteur's view, these are the 
main points on which Western Europe can 
satisfy the movements rightly or wrongly called 
pacifist and neutralist, not in order to silence 
them and then calmly resume an arms policy 
but to take account of the requirements of a 
strategy of deterrence based not only on the 
accumulation of armaments but also and above 
all on the desire of nations to defend their 
peace and independence at any cost. By ques-
tioning this desire, the development of pacifism 
and neutralism might weaken European posi-
tions vis-a-vis the United States, ruin the deter-
rent strength of the Atlantic Alliance and 
consequently make war in Europe more conceiv-
able. It cannot therefore be ignored and the 
alliance must answer the questions it raises but 
without jeopardising Europe's security. Indeed, 
there is every indication that the Soviet Union's 
aim, for the moment at least, is probably not 
so much to invade Western Europe as to reduce 
it to a situation in which the European coun-
tries have no choice but to renounce certain 
aspects of their internal and external sove-
reignty in face of Soviet pressure, this being 
currently but probably mistakenly called Fin-
landisation. This would then be a form of 
neutralisation involving a paralysis of external 
policy guaranteed by pro-Soviet political forces 
holding positions of responsibility. Under such 
pressure, democracy based on the free alter-
nation of different majorities in the government 
following the choice of the electorate would be 
likewise jeopardised. The attainment of this 
aim might be actively fostered by pacifist and 
neutralist movements which, on the one hand, 
would give the American partners in the Atlan-
tic Alliance the impression that Europe did not 
wish to defend itself against attack, thus bring-
ing grist to the mill of advocates of the with-
drawal of American forces from Europe, and, 
on the other hand, would make it difficult for 
the European governments, particularly at a 
time of economic difficulties, to pursue the 
effort necessary for ensuring their countries' 
security and gaining the confidence of their 
American allies. 
VI. Conclusions 
62. After the widespread demonstrations in 
autumn 1981, pacifist agitation calmed down 
relatively in 1982, although some observers 
considered it had played a major role in the 
Dutch elections in September. But the signs 
are that agitation will resume on a large scale, 
in Western Europe at least, in 1983 when the 
deployment of American medium-range missiles 
is due to begin. A strategy for 1983 was drawn 
up at a meeting of leaders of the peace 
movement in Paris in September 1982. The 
first action is planned to take place in the 
Federal Republic on 12th December with the 
participation of Americans, Belgians, Dutch 
and Italians to obstruct the twenty-five sites 
where it is planned to install these missiles. A 
second is planned in Sicily in May 1983 and a 
third in all the European capitals on 28th 
October. Other more local demonstrations are 
envisaged. 
63. It is therefore evident that all the prob-
lems raised by the pacifist movement will 
return to the centre of European politics next 
year, which fully justifies the request made by 
Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French 
Minister of Defence, to the WEU Assembly in 
December 1981 that it deal with matters raised 
by neutralism and pacifism. As the Council 
has to reply to Assembly recommendations, it 
was obviously not left out of this proposal. 
Clearly it was not a matter of planning a stra-
tegy to fight the movement but of asking the 
WEU Assembly what it considered should be 
the response to many Western Europeans 
espousing a neutralist or pacifist ideology. As 
this ideology is spread throughout Western 
Europe, European answers must be found. 
64. · This is not necessarily easy, since 
although Western European security forms a 
whole not all countries have the same require-
ments. There are various reasons for this, par-
ticularly the nearness of the threat, whether or 
not a country possesses nuclear weapons, and 
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above all the ability to decide on their use, and 
the extent and nature of a country's overseas 
commitments. These considerations have an 
effect on the size and trend of pacifist move-
ments in each country and are a major obstacle 
to political and military rapprochement, the 
need for which in the interests of overall secu-
rity and real progress towards European poli-
tical union cannot be denied. These are two 
aspects of WEU's main role under the modified 
Brussels Treaty and it is therefore its task to 
work out replies. , 
65. Your Rapporteur considers these replies 
must be positive on the essential aspect: the 
search for peace and disarmament. But at the 
same time they must take account of a number 
of facts which, in spite of the Afghanistan and 
Polish affairs, seem to have been left on one 
side by the peace movement which is more 
anxious to achieve tangible results as quickly as 
possible than to take account of the complexity 
of the international situation, whereas the role 
of politicians is above all to base peace on the 
security of the people for whom they are res-
ponsible. Your Rapporteur would sum up the 
essential requirements for consolidating peace 
in Europe as follows: 
(l) Disarmament is a true factor of peace 
only if negotiated, balanced and controlled so 
that it does not become an element of imbal-
ance, insecurity and hence tension. 
(ii) Disarmament must not jeopardise a sys-
tem of credible deterrence which ensures peace 
in Europe. It therefore has to be progressive. 
(iii) Medium-range nuclear weapons must be 
deployed in Europe as long as the Soviet Union 
does not follow• up the proposals for a general 
renunciation of such weapons. 
(iv) New impetus should be given to all the 
negotiations on the limitation and progressive 
reduction of the nuclear armaments of the 
United States and the Soviet Union and 
conventional weapons in all countries, particu-
larly in Europe. 
(v) There should be more consultation bet-
ween the European and American members of 
the Atlantic Alliance so as to give Western 
Europe all necessary guarantees about the 
deterrence protecting it. 
(vi) The Western European countries for 
their part should concert their defence and 
disarmament policies with a view to making 
specific disarmament proposals which are not 
liable to jeopardise their security. WEU, at 
both government and Assembly level, is the 
natural framework for this. 
(viz) A special effort should be made to assist 
the development of the third world, whatever 
the results of disarmament negotiations. 
DOCUMENT 934 
(viil) Public opinion should be better informed 
about the levels of forces and armaments 
deployed by East and West so as to prevent 
pacifism covering up the defence of certain 
countries' own interests. 
(ix) Representatives of pacifist movements 
should be listened to and their statements dis-
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cussed in each country's debate on internal 
policy, and the Eastern European countries 
should be reminded of the degree of freedom of 
expression they should be granted, particularly 
on the occasion of the CSCE meeting in 
Madrid. 
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APPENDIX 
(a) Comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
Manpower (thousands) 4,998 4,821 
Reserves (thousands) 5,079 7,138 
Main battle tanks 17,629 27,300 
Artillery 9,829 10,300 
Nuclear warhead launchers 1,662 3,151 
Submarines : 
- with cruise missiles 0 54 
- attack 184 174 
Surface vessels 1,351 1,437 
Combat aircraft 3,543 7,756 
(b) Comparison between the Soviet Union and the United States 
United States Soviet Union 
Population (millions) 230 269.6 
GNP (000 million) $: 2,925 Roubles: between 339 
and 614 
Defence budget 
in 000 million $: 216 Roubles: between 17.5 
and 192 
as% GNP 6.1% between 8.4 and 15% 
Total armed forces (thousands) 2,116 3,705 
Army 
Manpower (thousands) 791 1,825 
Tanks 12,130 50,000 
Nuclear warhead launchers 144 1,300 
Navy 
Major combat vessels 204 290 
Attack submarines 90 204 
Cruise missile submarines 0 69 
Air force 
Combat aircraft 3,650 4,480 
Strategic nuclear weapons 
ICBM 1,052 1,398 
Submarines : 
- submarines 32 83 
- launchers 518 989 
Long-range aircraft 436 150 
Source: IISS: The Military Balance 1982-83. 
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Nuclear warheads United States Soviet Union 
ICBM 2,000 5,500 
SLBM 5,000 1,300 
Strategic bomber 2,000 400 
Total strategic 9,000 7,200 
All other 15,000 8,800 
Grand total 24,000 16,000 
Source: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, 13th November 1981, page 17. 
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